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Abstract: We determine the optimal investment strategy of an individual who targets a
given rate of consumption and who seeks to minimize the probability of going bankrupt
before she dies, also known as lifetime ruin. We impose two types of borrowing constraints:
First, we do not allow the individual to borrow money to invest in the risky asset nor to
sell the risky asset short. However, the latter is not a real restriction because in the
unconstrained case, the individual does not sell the risky asset short. Second, we allow the
individual to borrow money but only at a rate that is higher than the rate earned on the
riskless asset.
We consider two forms of the consumption function: (1) The individual consumes
at a constant (real) dollar rate, and (2) the individual consumes a constant proportion
of her wealth. The first is arguably more realistic, but the second is closely connected
with Merton’s model of optimal consumption and investment under power utility. We
demonstrate that connection in this paper, as well as include a numerical example to
illustrate our results.
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Minimizing the Probability of Lifetime Ruin under Borrowing Constraints
1. Introduction
There is growing concern among Americans about financial ruin during retirement
(Parikh, 2003). These concerns are justified because a significant financial crisis is looming;
it is projected that retired Americans’ living expenses will exceed their financial resources
by $400 billion over the ten-year period 2020-2030 (VenDerhei and Copeland, 2003). This
shortfall is driven by demographic trends, the increased longevity of our aging population,
changes in Social Security, inadequate private retirement savings, and the continuing trend
toward defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)s, under which the individual - not the
employer - assumes all investment and longevity risk.
We employ techniques of stochastic optimal control to study the problem of how
an individual should invest her wealth in a risky financial market in order to minimize
the probability that she outlives her wealth, also known as the probability of lifetime ruin
(Milevsky and Robinson, 2000). Specifically, we determine the optimal investment strategy
of an individual who targets a given rate of consumption and who seeks to minimize
the probability of lifetime ruin. As employers shift from defined benefit plans to defined
contribution plans, the problem of outliving one’s wealth becomes relevant to more retirees
and to the actuaries and financial planners who advise them. A recent issue of The Actuary
(Parikh, 2003) points out that “according to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, in
1974, fifty-six percent of retirement income was coming from guaranteed sources. . . .Cerulli
Associates projects that will drop to twenty-four percent by 2030.”
When an individual seeks to find an optimal investment policy, the resulting optimal
policy depends on her optimization criterion. The most common optimization criterion
encountered in the finance literature is to maximize one’s expected discounted utility of
consumption and bequest. In the 1970s, Merton (1992) began study of this problem, and
many others continued his work; see, for example, Karatzas and Shreve (1998, Chapter 3)
and the discussion at the end of that chapter for further references. Notable extensions
include the work of Davis and Norman (1990), Zariphopoulou (1992), and Shreve and
Soner (1994) on portfolio selection with transaction costs; Duffie and Zariphopoulou (1993),
Duffie et al. (1997), and Koo (1998) on optimal investment and consumption strategies to
maximize expected utility of consumption and bequest in the presence of stochastic income;
and Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1991) and Zariphopoulou (1994) on optimal investment
under borrowing and trading constraints, respectively. See Zariphopoulou (1999, 2001) for
helpful summaries of the work to date in this area.
The goal of maximizing expected discounted utility of consumption and bequest may
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be difficult to implement because it depends on a subjective utility function for consump-
tion and bequest. Minimizing the probability of running out of money before dying might
prove easier for individuals to understand because that criterion is arguably more objective.
Indeed, there is something intuitively appealing about minimizing the probability of short-
fall that lends itself to asset allocation advice. In fact, the Nobel laureate William Sharpe
founded a financial services advisory firm that is largely based on using probabilities to
provide investment advice.
Other researchers have used the criterion of minimizing the probability of ruin of
an insurance company to find the optimal rate of new business accumulation (Hipp and
Taksar, 2000), to find the optimal investment strategy for the insurer (Hipp and Plum,
2000), and to find the optimal proportional reinsurance for the insurer (Schmidli, 2001).
Similarly, Olivieri and Pitacco (2003) consider the problem of maintaining solvency for a
pension plan.
From the individual investor’s standpoint, which the view we take in this paper,
Browne (1997) considers a financial model similar to ours (however, with no constraints on
borrowing), and he maximizes the probability of reaching a safe level before ruining; also,
see Browne (1995, 1999a, b) for related work. This existence of the safe level is based on
constant consumption and equals the price of a perpetuity that exactly covers the desired
consumption. He showed that no optimal policy exists for this problem because it is im-
possible to get to the safe region if one is maximizing this probability. Our problem differs
from his because we allow the individual to die before ruining, so that the individual can
thereby “win” the game. Plus, we optimize a different probability, namely the probability
of ruining before dying.
In minimizing the probability that the individual outlives her money, we consider
her random time of death, unlike Browne (1997). This assumption differs from the one
usually assumed by financial planners and common retirement planning software in that
they generally assume a specific age of death. A few earlier researchers have dealt with the
problem of outliving one’s wealth under the assumption of a random lifetime. For example,
Milevsky, Ho, and Robinson (1997) and Milevsky and Robinson (2000) consider a random
time of death modeled by using Canadian mortality data. They use simulation to find the
probability of lifetime ruin. Our work differs from Milevsky, Ho, and Robinson (1997) and
Milevsky and Robinson (2000) in that we find the optimal dynamic investment strategy to
minimize the probability of lifetime ruin, while they take the investment strategy as fixed
and find the corresponding probability of lifetime ruin.
Young (2004) considered the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin
when the individual continuously consumes either a constant (real) dollar amount or a
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constant proportion of wealth. For the most part, the results are intuitively appealing; as
the model parameters vary, the changes in the ruin probability and the asset allocation are
consistent with financial intuition. However, when consumption is constant, she found that
for wealth near 0, the optimal strategy is a heavily-leveraged position in the risky asset;
that is, the individual borrows money to invest in the risky asset. In order to avoid (nearly
certain) ruin at low wealth levels, the individual takes on the lesser risk of borrowing
a great deal of money at the riskless rate and investing it in the risky asset. Although
the objective of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin is intuitively appealing, this
leveraging at low wealth is not.
In this paper, we consider two model changes; one eliminates the leveraging, and the
other reduces it. In Section 2, we do not allow the individual to borrow money at all.
In Section 2.1, we present the financial model and define the corresponding probability of
ruin. In Section 2.2, we consider a constant rate of consumption, while in Section 2.3, we
consider a rate of consumption that is proportional to wealth. In the latter case, we show
that our individual behaves exactly as an individual who maximizes expected discounted
utility of consumption under a similar no-borrowing constraint and under power utility. In
Section 3, we parallel the work of Section 2 under the financial model that the individual
can borrow money but only at a rate that is higher than the rate earned on the riskless
asset. In Section 4, we present a numerical example to demonstrate the results of Sections
2 and 3. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Probability of Lifetime Ruin: No Borrowing
In this section, we consider the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin
when the individual is not allowed to borrow money. We also impose the constraint that
she cannot sell the risky asset short; however, this constraint is moot because she does not
wish to short-sell the risky asset in the unconstrained case. This occurs because we assume
that the drift on the risky asset exceeds the rate of return on the riskless asset. In Section
2.1, we present the financial market and define the probability of ruin. In Section 2.2, we
solve for the probability of ruin in the case for which consumption is constant. Section 2.3
parallels Section 2.2 in the case for which consumption is proportional to wealth. We show
how this latter case is related to optimal investment and consumption in a Merton model
with no borrowing.
2.1. Financial Market
In this section, we first present the financial ingredients that make up the individual’s
wealth, namely, consumption, a riskless asset, and a risky asset. We, then, define the
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minimum probability of lifetime ruin under the constraint of no borrowing (and no short-
selling, although this is not a real restriction).
The individual consumes at a continuous rate c(w), in which w is her current wealth.
In this paper, we consider two forms of the consumption function:
(1) c(w) = c; the individual consumes at a constant (nominal or real) dollar rate c. If c
is a real dollar rate, then returns in the financial market are real, too.
(2) c(w) = pw; the individual consumes a constant proportion p of her wealth.
We assume that the individual invests in a riskless asset whose price at time t, Xt,
follows the process dXt = rXtdt,X0 = x > 0, for some fixed rate of interest r > 0. Also,
the individual invests in a risky asset whose price at time t, St, follows geometric Brownian
motion given by
{
dSt = µStdt+ σStdBt,
S0 = S > 0,
(2.1)
in which µ > r, σ > 0, and B is a standard Brownian motion with respect to a filtration
of the probability space (Ω,F ,Pr).
Let Wt be the wealth at time t of the individual, and let pi0,t be the amount that the
decision maker invests in the risky asset at that time. We use a subscript 0 to denote the
fact that no borrowing (or short-selling) is allowed. It follows that the amount invested in
the riskless asset is Wt − pi0,t. Thus, wealth follows the process
{
dWt = [rWt + (µ− r)pi0,t − c(Wt)]dt+ σpi0,tdBt,
W0 = w.
(2.2)
By “outliving her wealth,” or equivalently “lifetime ruin,” we mean that the individ-
ual’s wealth reaches zero before she dies. Let τ0 denote the first time that wealth equals
zero, and let τd denote the random time of death of our individual. We assume that τd is
exponentially distributed with parameter λ (that is, with expected time of death equal to
1/λ); this parameter is also known as the hazard rate of the individual.
Denote the minimum probability that the individual outlives her wealth by ψ0(w), in
which the argument w indicates that one conditions on the individual possessing wealth w
at the current time. Recall that the subscript 0 reminds us that no borrowing is allowed.
Thus, ψ0 is the minimum probability that τ0 < τd, in which one minimizes with respect
to admissible investment strategies pi0. A strategy pi0 is admissible if it is Ft-progressively
measurable (in which Ft is the augmentation of σ(Ws : 0 ≤ s ≤ t)) and if it satisfies the
integrability condition
∫ t
0
pi20,sds <∞, almost surely, for all t ≥ 0. Also, in this section, we
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restrict pi0,t ∈ [0,Wt]; that is, no borrowing nor short-selling is allowed. Because µ > r,
the latter is effectively not a restriction. It follows that one can express ψ0 as follows:
ψ0(w) = inf
pi0
Pr [τ0 < τd|W0 = w] . (2.3)
For every α ∈ R, we associate a second-order differential operator Lα with this min-
imization problem as follows: For every open set G ⊂ R+ and for every h ∈ C2(G), we
define the function Lαh : G→ R by
Lαh(w) = [rw + (µ− r)α− c(w)]h′(w) +
1
2
σ2α2h′′(w)− λh(w). (2.4)
We use Lα in the following sections to characterize the minimum probability of ruin ψ0 in
the cases for which c(w) = c and c(w) = pw, respectively.
2.2. Constant Consumption
In this section, we consider the case for which the consumption rate c(w) = c, a
positive constant. Note that when wealth reaches c/r, then the individual can place all
her wealth in the riskless asset and consume c continuously without risk of running out of
money. Therefore, the probability of lifetime ruin equals 0 when wealth is greater than or
equal to c/r.
Define the stopping time τ = τd ∧ τc/r, in which τc/r = inf{t > 0 : Wt = c/r}, with
the convention that inf ∅ = ∞. It follows that ψ0(w) = infpi0∈APr [τ0 < τ |W0 = w], in
which A is the set of admissible strategies. We have the following verification theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose h0 is a decreasing function from R
+ to [0, 1] and suppose α0 is a
function from R+ to R+ that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) h0 ∈ C
2 on [0, c/r);
(ii) α0 ∈ A;
(iii) Lαh0(w) ≥ 0, for 0 ≤ α ≤ w < c/r;
(iv) Lα0(w)h0(w) = 0, for w ∈ (0, c/r);
(v) h0(0) = 1, and h0(w) = 0 for w ≥ c/r.
Under the above conditions, the minimum probability of the lifetime ruin ψ0 is given
by
ψ0(w) = h0(w), w ≥ 0, (2.5)
and the optimal investment strategy in the risky asset pi∗0 is given by
pi∗0(w) = α0(w), w ∈ [0, c/r]. (2.6)
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Proof. Assume that we have h0 as specified in the statement of this theorem. Let N
denote a Poisson process with rate λ such that N independent of the Brownian motion B
driving the wealth. The first occurrence of N represents the death of the individual.
Let α be some function on [0, c/r] such that 0 ≤ α(w) ≤ w. LetWα denote the wealth
process when we use α as the investment policy, and let αs = α(W
α
s ). Let ∆ represent
the “coffin state,” and let R+ ∪ {∆} be the one point compactification of R+. For any
function f : R+ → R+, we define its extension to R+ ∪ ∆ by assigning f(∆) = 0. We
kill the wealth process as soon as the Poisson process jumps (that is, when the individual
dies) and assign Wτd = ∆. Note that h0(c/r) = h0(W
α
τd
) = 0.
By applying Itoˆ’s lemma, we have
h0(W
α
t∧τ0∧τ
) = h0(w) +
∫ t∧τ0∧τ
0
(
(rWαs + (µ− r)αs − c)h
′
0(W
α
s ) +
1
2
σ2α2sh
′′
0(W
α
s )
)
ds
− λ
∫ t∧τ0∧τ
0
h0(W
α
s−)ds+
∫ t∧τ0∧τ
0
h′0(W
α
s )σαsdBs
+
∫ t∧τ0∧τ
0
(h0(W
α
s )− h0(W
α
s−))d(Ns − λs)
= h0(w) +
∫ t∧τ0∧τ
0
Lαh0(W
α
s )ds+
∫ t∧τ0∧τ
0
h′0(W
α
s )σαsdBs − h0(W
α
s−)d(Ns − λs).
(2.7)
The second equality follows from the definition of Lα and the fact that h0(W
α
τd
) = 0. Now
if we take the expectation of both sides, the expectation of the third term in (2.7) becomes
zero because
Ew
[∫ t∧τ0∧τ
0
(
(h′0(W
α
s ))
2σ2α2s + λh0(W
α
s )
)
ds
]
< Ew[τd]( max
0≤w≤c/r
(h′0(w))
2σ2(c2/r2) + λ) <∞,
(2.8)
since Ew[τd] = 1/λ, and h
′(w) is bounded on [0, c/r) by assumption (i). The first in-
equality in (2.8) follows from assumption (ii) of the theorem. Ew denotes the conditional
expectation given W0 = w.
Then, we have
Ew[h0(W
α
t∧τ0∧τ )] = h0(w) +Ew
[∫ t∧τ0∧τ
0
Lαh0(W
α
s )ds
]
≥ h0(w), (2.9)
where the inequality follows from assumption (iii) of the theorem. The expression in (2.9)
shows that
(
h0(W
α
t∧τ0∧τ
)
)
t≥0
is a sub-martingale.
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Now, since h0(0) = 1, h0(W
α
τd
) = 0, and h0(W
α
c/r) = 0, we have
h0(W
α
τ0∧τ ) = 1{τα0 <τ}, (2.10)
in which 1 is the indicator function. By taking expectations of both sides of (2.10), we
have
Ew[h0(W
α
τ0∧τ
)] = Prw(τ
α
0 < τ) ≥ h0(w). (2.11)
Prw denotes the conditional probability given W0 = w. We write τ
α
0 to emphasize the
dependence of τ0 on the strategy α. The last inequality follows from an aplication of
optional sampling theorem since
(
h0(W
α
t∧τ0∧τ
)
)
t≥0
is a sub-martingale. (We can apply
optional sampling theorem due to Theorem 3.15 of Karatzas and Shereve (1991) since
h0(w) ∈ [0, 1] for all w ≥ 0.) Therefore,
inf
α∈A
Prw(τ
α
0 < τ) = ψ(w) ≥ h0(w). (2.12)
Let α0 be as specified in the statement of this theorem; that is, α0 is the minimizer
of Lαh0. It follows that
(
h0(W
α0
t∧τ0∧τ
)
)
t≥0
is a martingale. Therefore,
Ew[h0(W
α0
τ0∧τ
)] = Prw(τ
α0
0 < τ) = h0(w); (2.13)
hence, we have demonstrated (2.5) and (2.6) on [0, c/r). Assumption (v) and the remark
immediately preceding the statement of this theorem complete the proof. QED
At this point, we could simply write down h0 and α0 and prove a theorem that they
satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 2.1, and we would be done. However, that would not
show the reader how to solve such optimization problems. Therefore, in the remainder of
this section, we demonstrate the steps of how to find h0 and α0, and we summarize our
results at the end.
In the unconstrained case (Young, 2004), the minimum probability of ruin ψ is given
by
ψ(w) =
(
1−
r
c
w
)d
, (2.14)
with
d =
1
2r
[
(r + λ+m) +
√
(r + λ+m)2 − 4rλ
]
> 1, (2.15)
and
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m =
1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2
. (2.16)
Because ψ is convex, the corresponding unconstrained optimal investment in the risky
asset pi∗ is given by the first-order necessary condition implicit in items (iii) and (iv) of
Theorem 2.1:
pi∗(w) =
µ− r
σ2
1
d− 1
( c
r
− w
)
, (2.17)
a non-negative, decreasing, linear function of wealth. Note that as wealth increases towards
c/r, the amount invested in the risky asset decreases to zero. This makes sense because
as the individual becomes wealthier, she does not need to take on as much risk to achieve
her fixed consumption rate of c.
On the other hand, for wealth small, the (unconstrained) optimal amount invested in
the risky asset is greater than wealth; that is, the individual borrows money to invest in
the risky asset in order to avoid the greater risk of lifetime ruin. We believe that most
people with small wealth will not borrow to invest in a risky asset to avoid ruin and that
no credible financial advisor will give such advice. Therefore, it is reasonable to include
the restriction that the amount invested in the risky asset cannot exceed current wealth.
In order to find h0 and α0 that satisfy Theorem 2.1, we hypothesize that they satisfy
additional properties not explicitly stated in Theorem 2.1. If we find h0 and α0 that satisfy
Theorem 2.1 and the additional properties, then these additional properties are implicit in
Theorem 2.1 because of the uniqueness of h0 on (0, c/r]. The function h0 is unique, if it
exists, because Theorem 2.1 states that if the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (defined
by items (i) through (v)) has a solution, then that solution equals the minimum probability
ψ0. We propose the following ansatz.
Ansatz: By considering the amount invested in the riskless asset in the unconstrained
case, namely w − pi∗(w), we conjecture the form of the constrained α0. To that end, note
that w−pi∗(w) is an increasing, linear function of wealth; also, the amount invested in the
riskless asset for w = 0 is negative and for w = c/r is positive. Therefore, we hypothesize
that the optimal constrained amount invested in the riskless asset is (1) a continuous
function of wealth; (2) 0 for wealth below some level, say wl, and (3) positive for wealth
greater than wl. The subscript l on wl stands for lending because for wealth above wl,
the individual lends money to the financial institution selling the riskless asset. In other
words, we suppose that the optimal investment in the riskless asset under the constraint of
no borrowing is a truncated version of the optimal investment in the unconstrained case.
We are not asserting that the wealth level above which the individual invests a positive
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amount in the riskless asset wl is the same in both cases; however, that turns out to be
the case, as we note below. In addition to these properties of α0, we hypothesize that h0
is strictly decreasing on [0, c/r].
Consider each of the two intervals (wl, c/r] and [0, wl] in turn. First, consider (wl, c/r],
on which we hypothesize that the borrowing constraint does not bind. We have the fol-
lowing proposition concerning h0 on this interval.
Proposition 2.2. Under the hypothesis that 0 ≤ α0(w) < w on (wl, c/r], the function h0
given by
h0(w) = β0
(
1−
r
c
w
)d
, (2.18)
with d as in (2.15) and β0 ≥ 1, satisfies the properties specified in Theorem 2.1. Thus, on
(wl, c/r], h0 is a multiple of the unconstrained probability of ruin ψ. The corresponding α0
on this interval is given by
α0(w) =
µ− r
σ2
1
d− 1
( c
r
− w
)
, (2.19)
identical to pi∗ in the unconstrained case.
Proof. From items (iii), (iv), and (v) of Theorem 2.1, we solve
λh0(w) = (rw − c)h
′
0(w) + min
α
[
(µ− r)αh′0(w) +
1
2
σ2α2h′′0 (w)
]
, (2.20)
with boundary conditions h0(c/r) = 0. We also have the boundary condition h
′
0(c/r),
which we demonstrate now. Consider the solution φ of (2.20) with λ = 0. Certainly, we
have h0 ≤ φ on an interval (c/r− δ, c/r] for some δ > 0 because the probability of ruining
before dying is no greater than the probability of ruining before infinity. If we show that
φ′(c/r) = 0, then h′0(c/r) because h0 is wedged between 0 and φ as wealth approaches 0.
Note that φ solves the equation
0 = (rw − c)φ′(w) + min
α
[
(µ− r)αφ′(w) +
1
2
σ2α2φ′′(w)
]
, (2.21)
with φ(c/r) = 0. From Pestien and Sudderth (1985), the optimal investment strategy α∗
is the one that maximizes the ratio of the drift to the variance, or equivalently,
f(α) =
(µ− r)α− (c− rw)
α2
. (2.22)
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The value of α that maximizes this expression is α∗(w) = 2(c− rw)/(µ− r). On the other
hand, we also have that
α∗(w) = −
µ− r
σ2
φ′(w)
φ′′(w)
(2.23)
from the first-order condition necessary in (2.21). Thus,
φ′(w) = k(c− rw)m/r, w ∈ (c/r − δ, c/r], (2.24)
for some k < 0. Thus, φ′(c/r) = 0, from which it follows that h′0(c/r) = 0.
Now, if h0 is not convex in some neighborhood of a point w
∗ ∈ (wl, c/r], then h
′′
0(w) <
0 on that neighborhood of w∗. It follows that the optimal solution α0 is as large as possible
on that neighborhood, contradicting our hypothesis that the borrowing constraint does not
hold on (wl, c/r]. Therefore, to be consistent with this hypothesis, h0 is convex on (wl, c/r],
and we consider the Legendre transform h˜ of h0 defined by
h˜(v) = min
w
[h0(w) + wv]. (2.25)
Note that we can recover h0 from h˜ by
h0(w) = max
v
[h˜(v)− wv]. (2.26)
The minimizing value of w in (2.25) equals I(−v) = h˜′(v), in which I is the inverse function
of h′0. Therefore, the maximizing value of v in (2.26) equals −h
′
0(w).
Substitute w = I(−v) in equation (2.20) to obtain
λh˜(v) + (r − λ)vh˜′(v)−mv2h˜′′(v) = cv, (2.27)
in which m is given in (2.16). The general solution of (2.27) is
h˜(v) = D˜1v
B˜1 + D˜2v
B˜2 +
c
r
v, (2.28)
in which D˜1 and D˜2 are constants to be determined, and B˜1 and B˜2 are the positive and
negative roots, respectively of
−λ− (r − λ+m)B˜ +mB˜2 = 0. (2.29)
Thus,
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B˜1 =
1
2m
[
(r − λ+m) +
√
(r − λ+m)2 + 4λm
]
> 1, (2.30)
and
B˜2 =
1
2m
[
(r − λ+m) −
√
(r − λ+m)2 + 4λm
]
< 0. (2.31)
Define vc = −h
′
0(c/r) = 0; that is, h˜
′(0) = c/r. From the definition of h˜ in (2.25) and
from h0(c/r) = 0, at v = vc = 0, we have
h˜(0) = 0. (2.32)
It follows that D˜2 = 0. We can, then, recover h0 from (2.28) and (2.26) and obtain the
expression for h0 in (2.18).
Because h0 is convex on (wl, c/r], the optimal policy α0 is given by the first-order
necessary condition in (2.20). This observation leads to the expression for α0 given in
equation (2.19). QED
Corollary 2.3. By the assumed continuity of α0,
wl =
x
1 + x
c
r
, (2.33)
in which
x =
µ− r
σ2
1
d− 1
. (2.34)
Because α0 = pi
∗ on [wl, c/r], the lending level wl is the same in both the unconstrained
case and in the no-borrowing case, in which the lending level is the wealth level above which
the individual invests a positive amount in the riskless asset. We find this result rather
surprising because we expected that the individual would have a higher lending level in
the constrained case in order to invest more money in the risky asset due to the fact that
she cannot invest as much in the risky asset as she wishes when her wealth is below wl.
We will see this myopia again in Section 3 when we consider the case of borrowing at a
rate higher than the lending rate.
Next, consider the interval [0, wl], on which α0(w) = w. We have the following
proposition concerning h0 on this interval. We state it without proof because it easily
follows from Theorem 2.1 and from our hypothesis that α0(w) = w on [0, wl].
Proposition 2.4. Under the hypothesis that α0(w) = w on [0, wl], the function h0 solves
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λh0 = (µw − c)h
′
0 +
1
2
σ2w2h′′0 , (2.35)
with boundary conditions
h0(0) = 1 (2.36)
and
h0(wl)
h′0(wl)
= −
1
d
( c
r
− wl
)
. (2.37)
These two boundary conditions allow us to solve the second-order ode (2.35) nu-
merically. Once we have a solution for h0 on [0, wl], then we can use the condition
h0(wl−) = h0(wl+) to determine the remaining unknown parameter β0.
It remains for us to show that if h0 is given as the solution of (2.35)− (2.37), then the
constrained optimal investment in the risky asset is equal to the current wealth. We state
this formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose h0 on [0, wl] solves (2.35)− (2.37), then
arg min
0≤α≤w
[
(µ− r)αh′0(w) +
1
2
σ2α2h′′0(w)
]
= w, 0 ≤ w ≤ wl. (2.38)
Proof. Define the parabola f by
f(α) = (µ− r)αh′0(w) +
1
2
σ2α2h′′0 (w), (2.39)
for w ∈ [0, wl]. Proving this proposition is equivalent to showing that
f ′(w) = (µ− r)h′0(w) + σ
2wh′′0(w) ≤ 0, (2.40)
for all wealth in [0, wl]. By substituting for h
′′
0 from the differential equation (2.35), this
inequality becomes
[−(µ+ r)w + 2c]h′0(w) + 2λh0(w) ≤ 0. (2.41)
Towards the goal of demonstrating inequality (2.41) on [0, wl], define the function y
by
y(w) =
h0(w)
h′0(w)
, (2.42)
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for w ∈ [0, wl]. Note that showing inequality (2.41) is equivalent to showing that y ≥ z on
[0, wl], in which z is given by
z(w) =
µ+ r
2λ
w −
c
λ
. (2.43)
We complete the proof of this proposition by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6. y > z on (0, wl), with equality at w = 0 and w = wl.
Proof. By substituting in the linear second-order differential equation (2.35), we obtain
a non-linear first-order differential equation for y on [0, wl]:
σ2w2(y′(w)− 1) = −2λy2(w) + 2(µw − c)y(w). (2.44)
The function z given by (2.43) solves a similar differential equation:
σ2w2
(
z′(w)−
µ+ r
2λ
)
= −2λz2(w) + 2
(
µ+ r
2
w − c
)
z(w). (2.45)
Note that y(0) = z(0) = −c/λ and y(wl) = z(wl) = −(1/d)(c/r − wl). We first show
that y′(wl) < z
′(wl). Indeed, after substituting for y(wl) in (2.44) and simplifying, we
obtain
y′(wl) = 1 +
r +m
λ
−
r
λ
d. (2.46)
By substituting for d in (2.46), we have that y′(wl) < z
′(wl) if and only if
−µ+ λ+m <
√
(r + λ+m)2 − 4rλ, (2.47)
which, because µ > r, holds if
−r + λ+m <
√
(r + λ+m)2 − 4rλ. (2.48)
Inequality (2.48) is true as one can see by squaring both sides and simplifying. Thus, we
have shown that y′(wl) < z
′(wl).
It follows that y > z on (wl − δ, wl) for some δ > 0. Next, suppose that there exists
w∗ ∈ (0, wl) such that y(w
∗) = z(w∗) and y > z on (w∗, wl). We will show that such a w
∗
cannot exist.
Because y(w∗) = z(w∗) and y > z on (w∗, wl), we have y
′(w∗) ≥ z′(w∗), which implies
that
14
1−
2λ
σ2(w∗)2
y(w∗)2 +
2(µw∗ − c)
σ2(w∗)2
y(w∗)
≥
µ+ r
2λ
−
2λ
σ2(w∗)2
z(w∗)2 +
2
(
µ+r
2
w∗ − c
)
σ2(w∗)2
z(w∗)
⇒1 +
2(µw∗ − c)
σ2(w∗)2
z(w∗) ≥
µ+ r
2λ
+
2
(
µ+r
2 w
∗ − c
)
σ2(w∗)2
z(w∗)
⇒1−
µ+ r
2λ
≥ −
µ− r
σ2w∗
(
µ+ r
2λ
w∗ −
c
λ
)
.
(2.49)
Note that the right-hand-side of the last line of (2.49) is positive. Therefore, if µ+r2λ ≥ 1,
then we have our contradiction.
To continue, suppose µ+r2λ < 1. In that case, the inequality in (2.49) becomes
w∗ ≥
2c(µ− r)
σ2(2λ− µ− r) + (µ2 − r2)
. (2.50)
If wl <
2c(µ−r)
σ2(2λ−µ−r)+(µ2−r2)
, then w∗ ∈ (0, wl) cannot exist, and we are done. Now,
by substituting for wl and simplifying, one can show that wl <
2c(µ−r)
σ2(2λ−µ−r)+(µ2−r2) is
equivalent to inequality (2.47), which we have already demonstrated. Therefore, no such
w∗ exists, and y > z on (0, wl). QED
We have the following theorem that summarizes the results of this section.
Theorem 2.7. For constant consumption c(w) = c, the constrained minimum probability
of ruin ψ0 ∈ C
1(R+) ∩ C2(R+ − {c/r}) is given by
ψ0(w) = h0(w), 0 ≤ w ≤ wl, (2.51)
in which h0 solves (2.35)− (2.37) with wl in (2.33), and
ψ0(w) = β0
(
1−
r
c
w
)d
, wl < w ≤ c/r, (2.52)
in which β0 = h0(wl)(1− rwl/c)
−d. Finally, ψ0(w) = 0 for w > c/r.
The optimal investment strategy is given by
pi∗0(w) =
{
w, if 0 ≤ w ≤ wl;
µ−r
σ2
1
d−1
(
c
r − w
)
, if wl < w ≤ c/r.
(2.53)
One can show that if initial wealth lies below c/r, then it never reaches that “safe”
level; that is, τα0c/r =∞. See Young (2004) and Browne (1997) for discussions of this phe-
nomenon in related models. In Section 4, we present numerical examples that demonstrate
the results of this section.
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2.3. Proportional Consumption
In this section, we consider the case for which the consumption rate is proportional
to wealth c(w) = pw, in which p > r. Note that if we specify that ruin occurs if wealth
reaches 0, then the individual with this consumption function does not ruin. Therefore, for
this case, we say that ruin occurs when wealth reaches w0 > 0; that is, let τ0 in definition
(2.3) be the (first) time that wealth reaches w0.
We have the following verification theorem whose proof we omit because it is similar
to the proof for Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.8. Suppose g0 is a strictly decreasing function from R
+ to [0, 1] and suppose
γ0 is a function from R
+ to R that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) g0 ∈ C
2 (R+) ;
(ii) 0 ≤ γ0(w) ≤ w for w ≥ 0;
(iii) Lγg0(w) ≥ 0, for 0 ≤ γ ≤ w;
(iv) Lγ0(w)g0(w) = 0, for w ≥ 0;
(v) g0(0) = 1, and limw→∞ g0(w) = 0.
Under the above conditions, the minimum probability of the lifetime ruin ψ0 is given
by
ψ0(w) = g0(w), w ≥ 0, (2.54)
and the optimal investment strategy in the risky asset pi∗0 is given by
pi∗0(w) = γ0(w), w ≥ 0. (2.55)
In the unconstrained case (Young, 2004), the minimum probability of ruin ψ is given
by
ψ(w) =
(
w
w0
)−ar
, (2.56)
with
ar =
1
2(p− r)
[
(r − p+ λ+m) +
√
(r − p+ λ+m)2 + 4λ(p− r)
]
> 0, (2.57)
and m is as in (2.16). Note that −ar equals d in (2.15) with r replaced by r − p.
Because ψ is convex, the corresponding unconstrained optimal investment in the risky
asset pi∗ is given by the first-order necessary condition implicit in items (iii) and (iv) of
Theorem 2.8:
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pi∗(w) =
µ− r
σ2
w
ar + 1
, (2.58)
a positive proportion of wealth. Note that pi∗(w) < w if and only µ−r
σ2
1
ar+1
< 1. This
observation corresponds neatly with the following theorem.
Theorem 2.9. The constrained minimum probability of ruin is given by
ψ0(w) =


(
w
w0
)−ar
, if µ−r
σ2
1
ar+1
< 1;(
w
w0
)−k
, if µ−r
σ2
1
ar+1
≥ 1,
(2.59)
in which
k =
1
σ2

(µ− p− 1
2
σ2
)
+
√(
µ− p−
1
2
σ2
)2
+ 2σ2λ

 > 0. (2.60)
The corresponding constrained optimal investment strategy is given by
pi∗0(w) =
{
µ−r
σ2
w
ar+1
, if µ−rσ2
1
ar+1
< 1;
w, if µ−rσ2
1
ar+1
≥ 1.
(2.61)
Proof. Note that if g(w) solves the equation
λg(w) = (p− r)wg′(w) + min
0≤γ≤w
[
(µ− r)γg′(w) +
1
2
σ2γ2g′′(w)
]
, (2.62)
then g(αw) and βg(w) also solve the equation for any α > 0 and β > 0. Because g0(w0) =
1, we have that gα defined by gα(w) = g0(αw) solves (2.62) with gα(w0/α) = 1. Also, gˆβ
defined by gˆβ(w) = βg0(w) solves (2.62) with gˆβ(w0/α) = βg0(w0/α). Set β = 1/g0(w0/α);
then, gˆβ(w0/α) = 1, and by uniqueness of g0, we have that gα(w) = gˆβ(w) for all w > 0.
We, therefore, have demonstrated the following functional equation for g0:
g0(uv) = g0(u)g0(vw0), u, v > 0. (2.63)
Define ρ(w) = g0(ww0); then, ρ solves
ρ(uv) = ρ(u)ρ(v), u, v > 0. (2.64)
Under mild regularity conditions on ρ, such as left- or right-continuity, it is well-known
that ρ is a power function, say w−a, for some a ∈ R. Thus, g0 is given by
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g0(w) =
(
w
w0
)−a
, (2.65)
for a > 0 because g0 is decreasing.
All that remains is for us to determine the value of a under various ranges of param-
eters. Items (iii) and (iv) in Theorem 2.8 lead us to solve
λ
(
w
w0
)−a
= (p− r)a
(
w
w0
)−a
+ min
0≤γ≤w
[
(µ− r)γ
(
−a
w0
)(
w
w0
)−a−1
+
1
2
σ2γ2
a(a+ 1)
w20
(
w
w0
)−a−2]
,
(2.66)
which reduces to
λ = a(p− r) + a min
0≤γ≤w
[
−(µ− r)
γ
w
+
1
2
σ2(a+ 1)
γ2
w2
]
. (2.67)
The quantity in square brackets is minimized by γ = w if µ−rσ2
1
ar+1
≥ 1; otherwise, it is
minimized by γ = µ−r
σ2
w
ar+1
. In the former case, a = ar in (2.57); in the latter, a = k in
(2.60). QED
Thus, the optimal investment strategy is same strategy as in the unconstrained case
but truncated by w if necessary.
Finally, we indicate how the results of this section are related to those under the same
financial model (including the constraint of no borrowing) for an individual who maximizes
her expected discounted utility of consumption, when the utility function exhibits constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA). We give the parameter values of the utility maximization
problem that lead to identical consumption and investment strategies as we found for the
individual who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin. Young (2004) found a similar
parallel in the unconstrained case.
Specifically, the utility function is of the form
u(c) =
cη
η
, η < 1, η 6= 0, (2.68)
and the corresponding value function is given by
V0(w) = sup
pi0
Ew
∫ ∞
0
e−βtu(Ct)dt, (2.69)
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in which β is a personal discount factor, and the supremum is taken over admissible
constrained investment strategies as in the definition of ψ0 in (2.3).
Let β = λ + p. One can adapt the arguments in Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1991)
to show that
(i) If µ−r
σ2
1
ar+1
< 1, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin
behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −ar, or equivalently, with CRRA =
1 + ar.
(ii) If µ−r
σ2
1
ar+1
≥ 1, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin
behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −k, or equivalently, with CRRA =
1 + k.
In other words, if we see an investor behaving as prescribed in this section, then we
do not know whether she is minimizing her probability of lifetime ruin under proportional
consumption or maximizing her utility of consumption under power utility. It is interesting
that we get this parallel when the personal discount factor β = λ + p. The discount β
measures the individual’s impatience. The higher the hazard rate λ or the proportion
consumed p, the greater the impatience, which corresponds with our intuition.
3. Probability of Lifetime Ruin: Borrowing Rate Higher than Lending Rate
In this section, we consider the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin
when the individual is allowed to borrow money at a rate b that is higher than the lending
rate r. In Section 3.1, we present the financial market. In Section 3.2, we solve for the
probability of ruin in the case for which consumption is constant. Section 3.3 parallels
Section 3.2 in the case for which consumption is proportional to wealth. We show how
this latter case is related to optimal investment and consumption in a Merton model with
borrowing, as considered in Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1991).
3.1. Financial Market
We assume that the individual invests a non-negative amount in a riskless asset that
earns interest at the constant rate r > 0. If the individual borrows money, then she pays
interest at the rate b ≥ r. Also, the individual invests in a risky asset whose price follows
geometric Brownian motion, as given in (2.1), in which µ > b ≥ r > 0.
Let Wt be the wealth at time t of the individual, and let pib,t be the amount that the
decision maker invests in the risky asset at that time. We use a subscript b to denote the
fact that borrowing is allowed but only at a higher rate than the lending rate. It follows
that the amount invested in the riskless asset is (Wt−pib,t)+, and the amount borrowed is
(pib,t −Wt)+. Thus, wealth follows the process
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{
dWt = [r(Wt − pib,t)+ − b(pib,t −Wt)+ + µpib,t − c(Wt)]dt+ σpib,tdBt,
W0 = w.
(3.1)
In this case, we denote the minimal probability of ruin by ψb and define it similarly
as in (2.3), except that an admissible investment strategy allows borrowing and short-
selling. For every α ∈ R, we associate a second-order differential operator Dα with this
minimization problem as follows: For every open set G ⊂ R+ and for every h ∈ C2(G),
we define the function Dαh : G→ R by
Dαh(w) = [bw + (µ− b)α− c(w)]h′(w) +
1
2
σ2α2h′′(w)− λh(w). (3.2)
Also, recall the definition of Lα given in (2.4). We use both differential operators in the
following sections to characterize the minimum probability of ruin ψb in the cases for which
c(w) = c and c(w) = pw, respectively.
3.2. Constant Consumption
In this section, we consider the case for which the consumption rate c(w) = c, a
positive constant, as in Section 2.2. As argued in that section, we have the probability of
ruin equal to zero when wealth is at least c/r. We begin with a verification theorem whose
proof we omit because it is similar to the one of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose hb is a decreasing function from R
+ to [0, 1] and suppose αb is a
function from [0, c/r] to R that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) hb ∈ C
2 on [0, c/r);
(ii) Lαhb(w) ≥ 0, for w ∈ (0, c/r) and α ∈ R;
(iii) If 0 ≤ αb(w) ≤ w, then L
αb(w)hb(w) = 0;
(iv) Dαhb(w) ≥ 0, for w ∈ (0, c/r) and α ∈ R;
(v) If αb(w) ≥ w, then D
αb(w)hb(w) = 0;
(vi) hb(0) = 1, hb(w) = 0 = αb(w) for w ≥ c/r.
Under the above conditions, the minimum probability of the lifetime ruin ψb is given
by
ψb(w) = hb(w), w ≥ 0, (3.3)
and the optimal investment strategy in the risky asset pi∗b is given by
pi∗b (w) = αb(w), w ∈ [0, c/r]. (3.4)
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As in Section 2.2, we demonstrate the steps of how to find hb and αb that satisfy the
hypotheses of Theorem 3.1. Recall that in the case for which b = r, the amount invested
in the riskless asset increases (linearly) from a negative amount when w = 0 (that is, the
individual borrows money to invest in the risky asset) to a positive amount when w = c/r.
Ansatz: We use this result to hypothesize that in the case with µ > b ≥ r, the
amount invested in the riskless asset satisfies
w − αb(w)


< 0, if w < wb;
= 0, if wb ≤ w ≤ wl;
> 0, if wl < w ≤ c/r;
(3.5)
for some constants 0 ≤ wb ≤ wl ≤ c/r. In addition, we hypothesize that αb is continuous
on [0, c/r]. Finally, we suppose that hb is strictly decreasing on [0, c/r].
Under the ansatz, we, therefore, have three intervals of wealth to consider: (wl, c/r],
[wb, wl], and [0, wb). First, consider (wl, c/r], on which the individual invests a positive
amount of money in the riskless asset at the rate r. We have the following proposition
concerning hb on this interval. The proof is identical to that of Propositions 2.2, so we
omit it.
Proposition 3.2. Under the hypothesis that 0 ≤ αb(w) < w on (wl, c/r], the function hb
given by
hb(w) = βb
(
1−
r
c
w
)d
, (3.6)
with d given in (2.15) and β0 ≥ βb ≥ 1, satisfies the properties specified in Theorem 3.1.
Thus, on (wl, c/r], hb is a multiple of the probability of ruin ψ in (2.14). The corresponding
αb on this interval is given by
αb(w) =
µ− r
σ2
1
d− 1
( c
r
− w
)
, (3.7)
identical to pi∗ in the case for which b = r and to pi∗0 in the no-borrowing case.
Corollary 3.3. By the assumed continuity of αb, it follows from (3.7) that wl is given by
(2.33).
In other words, the lending level wl in the case with borrowing is identical to the
lending level in the case for which b = r and in the no-borrowing case. Thus, we see the
same myopia in this case that we saw in the no-borrowing case.
Next, consider the interval [wb, wl], on which αb(w) = w. We have the following
proposition concerning hb on this interval that we state without proof.
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Proposition 3.4. If hb exists as specified in Theorem 3.1, then under the hypothesis that
αb(w) = w on [wb, wl], hb solves
λhb = (µw − c)h
′
b +
1
2
σ2w2h′′b , (3.8)
with boundary condition
hb(wl)
h′b(wl)
= −
1
d
( c
r
− wl
)
. (3.9)
As in Section 2.2, we similarly define y on [wb, wl] by
y(w) =
hb(w)
h′b(w)
. (3.10)
Note that y solves the differential equation (2.44) with boundary condition (3.9) and (3.10)
at w = wl. Thus, the function y in (3.10) is identical to the one in Section 2.2. For that
reason, we use the same letter y to denote this function. We use this function later in
determining hb on [0, wb), including determining wb itself.
Finally, consider the interval [0, wb), on which we hypothesize that the individual
borrows money at the rate b. Before stating a proposition concerning hb on this interval,
we outline a program whereby one can determine hb from its Legendre transform h˜. By
items (v) and (vi) of Theorem 3.1, the function hb solves
λhb = (bw − c)h
′
b +min
α
[
(µ− b)αh′b(w) +
1
2
σ2α2h′′b (w)
]
, (3.11)
with boundary condition hb(0) = 1. Note that (3.11) is a fully-nonlinear differential
equation, but we can linearize (3.11) by rewriting it in terms of the Legendre transform of
hb.
Define the Legendre transform h˜ of hb on [0, wb) by
h˜(v) = min
w
[hb(w) + wv]. (3.12)
Note that we can recover hb from h˜ by
hb(w) = max
v
[h˜(v)− wv]. (3.13)
The minimizing value of w in (3.12) equals I(−v) = h˜′(v), in which I is the inverse function
of h′b. Therefore, the maximizing value of v in (3.13) equals −h
′
b(w).
Substitute w = I(−v) in equation (3.11) to obtain
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λh˜(v) + (b− λ)vh˜′(v)−mbv
2h˜′′(v) = cv, (3.14)
in which mb is defined as in (2.16) with r replaced by b. The general solution of (3.14) is
h˜(v) = D1v
B1 +D2v
B2 +
c
b
v, (3.15)
in which D1 and D2 are constants to be determined, and B1 and B2 are the positive and
negative roots, respectively of
−λ− (b− λ+mb)B +mbB
2 = 0. (3.16)
Thus,
B1 =
1
2mb
[
(b− λ+mb) +
√
(b− λ+mb)2 + 4λmb
]
> 1, (3.17)
and
B2 =
1
2mb
[
(b− λ+mb)−
√
(b− λ+mb)2 + 4λmb
]
< 0. (3.18)
Define v0 = −h
′
b(0) and vb = −h
′
b(wb); that is,
h˜′(v0) = 0, (3.19)
and
h˜′(vb) = wb. (3.20)
Recall that we still do not know wb.
From the definition of h˜ in (3.12), at v = v0, we have
h˜(v0) = 1. (3.21)
At v = vb, we use the assumed continuity of αb(w) = −
µ−b
σ2
h′
b
(w)
h′′
b
(w) at w = wb to get
h˜′(vb) = −
µ− b
σ2
vbh˜
′′(vb). (3.22)
To summarize where we are at this point: To determine hb on [0, c/r], we need to
know βb, wb, vb, v0, D1, and D2. In what follows, we use expressions (3.19) − (3.22),
together with smoothness of hb, to calculate these six unknowns.
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For the moment, assume that we know wb, and later we show how to obtain it from
the function y. Equations (3.20) and (3.22) imply, respectively,
D1B1v
B1
b +D2B2v
B2
b +
c
b
vb = wbvb, (3.23)
and
D1B1(B1 − 1)v
B1
b +D2B2(B2 − 1)v
B2
b = −wbvb
σ2
µ− b
. (3.24)
Solve (3.23) and (3.24) for D1 and D2 to get
D1 = −
v1−B1b
B1(B1 −B2)
[
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
]
, (3.25)
and
D2 = −
v1−B2b
B2(B1 −B2)
[
−wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(B1 − 1)
]
. (3.26)
Substitute for D1 and D2 in equation (3.19), that is, in −D1B1v
B1−1
0 −D2B2v
B2−1
0 =
c
b
, to get
1
B1 −B2
(
v0
vb
)B1−1 [
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
]
+
1
B1 −B2
(
v0
vb
)B2−1 [
−wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(B1 − 1)
]
=
c
b
.
(3.27)
We next show that (3.27) has a unique root v0/vb > 1. First, note that if v0/vb = 1, then
the left-hand-side of (3.27) equals c/b − wb < c/b. Next, note that as v0/vb → ∞, the
left-hand-side of (3.27) goes to infinity if
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2) > 0, (3.28)
which we will show is true when we find wb. Finally, by taking the derivative of the left-
hand-side of (3.27) with respect to v0/vb > 1, one can show that the left-hand-side of
(3.27) is increasing if (3.28) holds.
Once we have the solution v0/vb > 1 of equation (3.27), we can substitute it into
(3.21) via D1 and D2 and solve for v0 as follows:
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−
1
B1(B1 −B2)
(
v0
vb
)B1−1 [
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
]
−
1
B2(B1 −B2)
(
v0
vb
)B2−1 [
−wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(B1 − 1)
]
+
c
b
=
1
v0
.
(3.29)
Then, we can get vb from
vb =
v0
v0/vb
, (3.30)
and by substituting vb into (3.25) and (3.26), we have D1 and D2, respectively.
Now, it only remains for us to determine wb and verify inequality (3.28). Once we
have wb, we calculate hb(wb) by continuity of the solution of hb on [0, wb), from which we
get hb on [wb, wl] by numerically solving the boundary-value problem in (3.8) and (3.9).
In particular, we compute hb(wl), from which βb follows.
Lemma 3.5. wb is the unique solution of
y(wb) =
µ+ b
2λ
wb −
c
λ
. (3.31)
Proof. By assumed smoothness of hb, the differential equation (2.35) holds at w = wb,
with hb substituted for h0; specifically,
λhb(wb) = (µwb − c)h
′
b(wb) +
1
2
σ2w2bh
′′
b (wb). (3.32)
Into equation (3.32), substitute
wb = −
µ− b
σ2
h′b(wb)
h′′b (wb)
(3.33)
to get
λhb(wb) = (µwb − c)h
′
b(wb)−
1
2
(µ− b)wbh
′
b(wb). (3.34)
Recall that y(wb) = hb(wb)/h
′
b(wb); thus, (3.34) becomes (3.31).
Note that the right-hand-side of (3.31) is of the same form as z given in (2.43) with r
replaced by b, so denote the function implied by the right-hand-side of (3.31) by zb. Thus,
wb is defined similarly to wl because y(wl) =
µ+r
2λ wl −
c
λ .
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It remains for us to show that y intersects zb uniquely. First, suppose that y intersects
zb in two points 0 < w
∗
b < wb < wl with y
′(w∗b ) ≥ z
′
b(w
∗
b ) =
µ+b
2λ and y
′(wb) ≤ z
′
b(wb) =
µ+b
2λ . From the proof of Lemma 2.6, we have that
1−
µ+ b
2λ
≥ −
µ− b
σ2w∗b
zb(w
∗
b ). (3.35)
The right-hand-side of (3.35) is positive, so if µ+b
2λ
≥ 1, then we have our contradiction.
Therefore, suppose µ+b
2λ
< 1, from which it follows as in the proof of Lemma 2.6 that
w∗b ≥
2c(µ− b)
σ2(2λ− µ− b) + (µ2 − b2)
. (3.36)
On the other hand, y′(wb) ≤ z
′
b(wb) implies that
wb ≤
2c(µ− b)
σ2(2λ− µ− b) + (µ2 − b2)
, (3.37)
a contradiction to w∗b < wb. Thus, if y intersects zb, it can do so in only one point.
Finally, we show that y intersects zb for all µ > b > r. It is enough to show that y
′(0) =
µ/λ. From y’s differential equation (2.44), we obtain that y(0) = −c/λ. Differentiate (2.44)
and subsitute w = 0 to get y′(0) = µ/λ. Thus, we are done. QED
In a corollary to Lemma 3.5, we assert that inequality (3.28) holds.
Corollary 3.6. Inequality (3.28) holds.
Proof. It is enough to show that wb < c/b. zb intersects the horizontal axis at w =
2c/(µ+ b) > wb. Now, 2c/(µ+ b) < c/b because µ > b; thus, wb < c/b. QED
We summarize the solution of hb on (0, wb) in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.7. On (0, wb), in which wb is given in Lemma 3.5, first solve (3.27) for
v0/vb > 1, then solve (3.29) and (3.30) for v0 and vb, respectively. Then, use vb and wb in
the expressions for D1 and D2, namely (3.25) and (3.26), respectively. Next, determine h˜
in (3.15). Finally, obtain hb from h˜ via the transform in (3.13).
Next, we show that if hb solves (3.8) and the corresponding boundary conditions,
then the optimal investment in the risky asset is equal to the current wealth. We state
this formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose hb solves (3.8), (3.9), and hb(wb+) = hb(wb−), in which wb is
given in Lemma 3.5; then,
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argmin
(
min
α≥w
[
(µ− b)αh′b(w) +
1
2
σ2α2h′′b (w)
]
,
min
α≤w
[
(µ− r)αh′b(w) +
1
2
σ2α2h′′b (w)
])
= w.
(3.38)
Proof. Consider the parabolas f1 and f2 defined by
f1(pi) = (µ− b)pih
′
b(w) +
1
2
σ2pi2h′′b (w), (3.39)
and
f2(pi) = (µ− r)pih
′
b(w) +
1
2
σ2pi2h′′b (w). (3.40)
The minimum of f1 for pi ≥ w occurs at pi = w if f
′
1(w) ≥ 0, which is true if y < zb on
(wb, wl). From the proof of Lemma 3.5, this latter condition is true. The minimum of
f2 for pi ≤ w occurs at pi = w if f
′
2(w) ≤ 0, which is true if y > z on (wb, wl). From
Lemma 2.6, this latter condition is true. Therefore, the minimum of the expression on the
left-hand-side of (3.38) occurs at pi = w. QED
Parallel to Proposition 3.8, we have the following proposition that asserts that the
optimal investment in the risky asset on (0, wb) exceeds the current wealth; therefore, the
individual does borrow money when wealth is less than wb.
Proposition 3.9. On (0, wb), the optimal policy αb satisfies
αb(w) > w. (3.41)
Proof. αb(w) > w if and only if
−
µ− b
σ2
vh˜′′(v) > h˜′(v). (3.42)
By substituting for h˜ in (3.42) and by using the expressions in (3.25) and (3.26) for D1
and D2, respectively, we obtain the following equivalent inequality.
1
B1 −B2
(
v
vb
)B1−1 (µ− b
σ2
(B1 − 1) + 1
)(
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
)
+
1
B1 −B2
(
v
vb
)B2−1 (µ− b
σ2
(B2 − 1) + 1
)(
−wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(B1 − 1)
)
>
c
b
.
(3.43)
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At v = vb, the left-hand-side of (3.43) equals c/b. Therefore, if the left-hand-side of
(3.43) increases with respect to v/vb, then we are done. The derivative of the left-hand-side
of (3.43) is positive if and only if inequality (3.28) holds (which we know to be true from
Corollary 3.6) and if
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
(
µ− b
σ2
(B1 − 1) + 1
)(
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
)
+
B2 − 1
B1 −B2
(
µ− b
σ2
(B2 − 1) + 1
)(
−wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(B1 − 1)
)
> 0.
(3.44)
By simplifying inequality (3.44), one can show that it is equivalent to
wb(σ
2(µ+ b− 2λ)− (µ− b)2) + 2b(µ− b)
(c
b
− wb
)
> 0. (3.45)
In order to show inequality (3.45), we consider two cases: (µ + b)/(2λ) ≥ 1, and
(µ+ b)/(2λ) < 1. First, suppose (µ+ b)/(2λ) ≥ 1. If σ2(µ+ b − 2λ) − (µ− b)2 ≥ 0, then
we are done because c/b − wb > 0. On the other hand, if σ
2(µ + b − 2λ) − (µ − b)2 < 0,
then inequality (3.45) holds if
2c
µ+ b
(σ2(µ+ b− 2λ)− (µ− b)2) + 2b(µ− b)
(c
b
− wb
)
≥ 0 (3.46)
because we replaced wb with something larger. Now, inequality (3.46) reduces to
σ2(µ+ b− 2λ) ≥ 0, (3.47)
which is true by assumption.
Next, suppose (µ + b)/(2λ) < 1. Then, y(wb) = zb(wb) and y
′(wb) > z
′
b(wb) imply
that
wb <
2c(µ− b)
σ2(2λ− µ− b) + (µ2 − b2)
, (3.48)
as in inequality (3.37). Thus, inequality (3.45) holds if
2c(µ− b)
σ2(2λ− µ− b) + (µ2 − b2)
(σ2(µ+ b− 2λ)− (µ− b)2)
+ 2b(µ− b)
(
c
b
−
2c(µ− b)
σ2(2λ− µ− b) + (µ2 − b2)
)
≥ 0
(3.49)
because we replaced wb with something larger. The left-hand-side of inequality (3.49)
reduces to 0, so we are done. QED
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We have the following theorem that summarizes the results of this section.
Theorem 3.10. For constant consumption c(w) = c, the borrowing level wb is given by
Lemma 3.5, and the lending level is (2.33). The minimum probability of ruin ψb is given
by
ψb(w) = hb(w), 0 ≤ w < wb, (3.50)
in which hb is obtained as described in Proposition 3.7;
ψb(w) = hb(w), wb ≤ w ≤ wl, (3.51)
in which hb is obtained from Proposition 3.4 and from continuity of hb at wb; and
ψb(w) = βb
(
1−
r
c
w
)d
, wl < w ≤ c/r, (3.52)
in which βb = hb(wl)(1− rwl/c)
−d. Finally, ψb(w) = 0 for w > c/r.
The optimal investment strategy is given by
pi∗b (w) =


−µ−b
σ2
vh˜′′(v), if 0 ≤ w < wb, for h˜
′(v) = w;
w, if wb ≤ w ≤ wl;
µ−r
σ2
1
d−1
(
c
r − w
)
, if wl < w ≤ c/r,
(3.53)
in which h˜ is given by (3.12) on [0, wb).
During the remainder of this section, we examine the limit of the optimal investment
strategy as the borrowing rate b approaches the drift on the risky asset µ from the left.
We show that the optimal investment strategy approaches that in the no-borrowing case
if µ ≤ λ; however, if µ > λ, then the amount invested in the risky asset is arbitrarily large
for wealth near zero. Thus, instead of reducing leveraging by imposing a higher borrowing
rate, leveraging actually increases if µ > λ.
We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.11. The probability of lifetime ruin ψb is convex on (0, c/r). In addition,
(a) If µ ≤ λ, then ψ0 is convex on (0, c/r).
(b) If µ > λ, then ψ0 is convex on (wµ, c/r) but is concave on (0, wµ), in which
limb→µ− wb = wµ > 0, with wb given in Lemma 3.5.
Proof. We prove this lemma by considering limb→µ− wb = wµ. We show that wµ = 0
when ψ0 has no inflection point, that is, when ψ0 is convex on (0, c/r). This occurs when
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µ ≤ λ. Similarly, we show that wµ > 0 when ψ0 changes concavity; wµ is the inflection
point of ψ0 in this case. This occurs when µ > λ.
Recall that for µ > b ≥ r, y intersects zb at w = 0 and at w = wb ∈ (0, wl] with
y > zb on (0, wb). By continuity of y, if we take the limit as b approaches µ from the left,
then y will intersect zµ at w = 0 and at w = wµ ≥ 0 with y > zµ on (0, wµ), in which
zµ(w) = (µ/λ)w − c/λ. Note that (0, wµ) is empty if wµ = 0.
Calculate y′′(0) by differentiating equation (2.44) twice and evaluating the result at
w = 0: y′′(0) = −λ(µ − λ)/c2. Recall that y′(0) = µ/λ = z′µ(0). If µ ≤ λ, then y
′′(0) ≤ 0
from which it follows that y ≤ zµ on (0, δ) for some δ > 0. Thus, wµ = 0 in this case
because y does not intersection zµ.
If µ > λ, then y′′(0) > 0 and ψ′′0 (0) < 0. From equation (2.35), note that ψ
′′
0 is
proportional to zµ − y on (0, wl]. Thus, y intersects zµ at w = 0 and w = wµ > 0 with
y > zµ on (0, wµ) and y < zµ on (wµ, wl). Equivalently, ψ
′′
0 < 0 on (0, wµ), and ψ
′′
0 > 0 on
(wµ, wl), from which it follows that wµ is the inflection point of ψ0. QED
Theorem 3.12. Let wb be as given in Lemma 3.5. As b→ r+, ψb and pi
∗
b converge to the
probability of ruin and investment strategy, ψ in (2.14) and pi∗ in (2.17), respectively.
(a) If µ ≤ λ, then as b→ µ−, ψb and pi
∗
b converge to ψ0 and pi
∗
0 , respectively.
(b) If µ > λ, then as b → µ−, ψb does not converge to ψ0. Moreover, pi
∗
b (w) becomes
arbitrarily large for wealth near 0 as b→ µ−.
Proof. Because limb→r+ wb = wl, ψb and pi
∗
b converge to the probability of ruin and
investment strategy, ψ and pi∗, respectively, as b→ r+.
If µ ≤ λ, then the proof of Lemma 3.11 gives us that limb→µ− wb = 0. It follows easily
that ψb and pi
∗
b converge to ψ0 and pi
∗
0 , respectively, in this case. Next, from financial
arguments, we have that ψb increases as b→ µ−; thus, limb→µ− ψb(w) = supr≤b<µ ψb(w).
This limit is convex, since the supremum of convex functions is convex (Rockafellar, 1970,
Theorem 5.5). If µ > λ, then ψ0 is not convex; therefore, ψb does not converge to ψ0.
It remains for us to show that if µ > λ, then pi∗b (w) becomes arbitrarily large for wealth
w near 0. To this end, consider the expression for the optimal investment strategy in terms
of the Legendre transform h˜ in (3.15): pi∗b (w) = −
µ−b
σ2 vh˜
′′(v), in which v = −h′b(w). In
terms of the dual variable v, the optimal investment strategy on [vb, v0], after substituting
for D1 and D2 from (3.25) and (3.26), respectively, is given by
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µ− b
σ2
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
(
v
vb
)B1−1 (
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
)
+
µ− b
σ2
B2 − 1
B1 −B2
(
v
vb
)B2−1 (
−wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(B1 − 1)
)
.
(3.54)
Let v = v0 in this expression, which corresponds to wealth equal to 0. From equation
(3.27), this expression becomes
µ− b
σ2
B1 − 1
B1 −B2
(
v0
vb
)B1−1(
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
)
+
µ− b
σ2
(B2 − 1)
[
c
b
−
1
B1 −B2
(
v0
vb
)B1−1 (
wb
σ2
µ− b
+
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
)]
=
µ− b
σ2
(B2 − 1)
c
b
+
(
v0
vb
)B1−1 (
wb +
µ− b
σ2
(c
b
− wb
)
(1−B2)
)
.
(3.55)
Now, as b approaches µ from the left, µ−bσ2 B2 goes to 0; however, v0/vb is greater than 1
and B1 goes to infinity. Thus, the expression in (3.55) goes to infinity, and we are done.
QED
It is quite interesting that the limiting behavior of ψb and pi
∗
b depends on the relative
values of the drift on the risky asset and the hazard rate. If the drift on the risky asset
is less than the hazard rate, then as the borrowing rate approaches the drift on the risky
asset, the individual borrows less and less. The probability of dying is great enough that
she does not need to take on the risk of borrowing in order to avoid running out of money
before dying. On the other hand, if the drift on the risky asset is greater than the hazard
rate, then because she has to pay more interest, she gets less value from her leverage than
at lower interest rates and therefore borrows more and more.
In Section 4, we present numerical examples that demonstrate the results of this
section.
3.3. Proportional Consumption
In this section, we consider the case for which the consumption rate is proportional
to wealth c(w) = pw, in which r ≤ b < min(µ, p). Note that if we specify that ruin occurs
if wealth reaches 0, then the individual with this consumption function does not ruin.
Therefore, for this case, as in Section 2.3, we say that ruin occurs when wealth reaches
w0 > 0; that is, let τ0 in definition (2.3) be the (first) time that wealth reaches w0.
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We have the following verification theorem whose proof we omit because it is similar
to the proof for Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.13. Suppose gb is a strictly decreasing function from R
+ to [0, 1] and suppose
γb is a function from R
+ to R that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) gb ∈ C
2 (R+) ;
(ii) Lγgb(w) ≥ 0, for w ≥ 0 and γ ∈ R;
(iii) If γb(w) ≤ w, then L
γb(w)gb(w) = 0;
(iv) Dγgb(w) ≥ 0, for w ≥ 0 and γ ∈ R;
(v) If γb(w) ≥ w, then D
γb(w)gb(w) = 0;
(vi) gb(0) = 1, and limw→∞ gb(w) = 0.
Under the above conditions, the minimum probability of the lifetime ruin ψ0 is given
by
ψb(w) = gb(w), w ≥ 0, (3.56)
and the optimal investment strategy in the risky asset pi∗0 is given by
pi∗b (w) = γb(w), w ≥ 0. (3.57)
As in the proof of Theorem 2.9, we can show that gb is given by
gb(w) =
(
w
w0
)−a
, (3.58)
for some a > 0. From items (ii) through (v) of Theorem 3.13, we have that a solves
λ = min
{
a(p− r) + a min
0≤γ≤w
[
−(µ− r)
γ
w
+
1
2
σ2(a+ 1)
γ2
w2
]
,
a(p− b) + amin
γ≥w
[
−(µ− b)
γ
w
+
1
2
σ2(a+ 1)
γ2
w2
]}
.
(3.59)
The function f1 given by f1(γ) = −(µ−r)
γ
w+
1
2σ
2(a+1) γ
2
w2 is minimized on 0 ≤ γ ≤ w
by γ = w if µ−r
σ2
1
a+1
≥ 1; otherwise, f1 is minimized by γ =
µ−r
σ2
w
a+1
.
Similarly, the function f2 given by f2(γ) = −(µ − b)
γ
w
+ 1
2
σ2(a + 1) γ
2
w2
is minimized
on γ ≥ w by γ = w if µ−bσ2
1
a+1 < 1; otherwise, f2 is minimized by γ =
µ−b
σ2
w
a+1 .
We have three cases: (1) µ−rσ2
1
a+1 < 1; (2)
µ−b
σ2
1
a+1 ≥ 1; and (3)
µ−r
σ2
1
a+1 ≥ 1 and
µ−b
σ2
1
a+1 < 1. We consider each in turn.
Case 1: µ−r
σ2
1
a+1
< 1.
Because b > r, we also have µ−b
σ2
1
a+1
< 1; thus, equation (3.59) becomes
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λ = min
[
a(p− r) + af1
(
µ− r
σ2
w
a+ 1
)
, d(p− b) + df2(w)
]
= a(p− r)−
am
a+ 1
,
(3.60)
from which it follows that a = ar in (2.57).
Case 2:
µ−b
σ2
1
a+1 ≥ 1.
Because b > r, we also have µ−rσ2
1
a+1 ≥ 1; thus, equation (3.59) becomes
λ = min
[
a(p− r) + af1(w), d(p− b) + df2
(
µ− b
σ2
w
a+ 1
)]
= a(p− b)−
amb
a+ 1
,
(3.61)
from which it follows that a = ab in which ab is given by (2.57) with r and m replaced by
b and mb, respectively.
Case 3: µ−rσ2
1
a+1 ≥ 1 and
µ−b
σ2
1
a+1 < 1.
In this case, equation (3.59) becomes
λ = min [a(p− r) + af1(w), d(p− b) + df2(w)]
= a
(
p− µ+
1
2
σ2(a+ 1)
)
,
(3.62)
from which it follows that a = k in (2.60).
We summarize the results of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.14. The minimum probability of ruin is given by
ψb(w) =
(
w
w0
)−a
, (3.63)
in which a > 0 is given by
a =


ar, if
µ−r
σ2
1
ar+1
< 1;
k, if µ−bσ2
1
k+1 < 1 ≤
µ−r
σ2
1
k+1 ;
ab, if
µ−b
σ2
1
ab+1
≥ 1.
(3.64)
The corresponding constrained optimal investment strategy is given by
pi∗b (w) =


µ−r
σ2
w
ar+1
, if µ−r
σ2
1
ar+1
< 1;
w, if µ−b
σ2
1
k+1
< 1 ≤ µ−r
σ2
1
k+1
;
µ−b
σ2
w
ab+1
, if µ−bσ2
1
ab+1
≥ 1.
(3.65)
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We have the following corollary of Theorem 3.14 that gives us the limit of ψb and pi
∗
b
as b approaches min(µ, p).
Corollary 3.15. From limb→r+ ab = ar, it follows that ψb and pi
∗
b converge to ψ in (2.56)
and pi∗ and (2.58), respectively. From limb→min(µ,p)−
µ−b
σ2
1
ab+1
= 0, it follows that
lim
b→min(µ,p)−
ψb(w) = ψ0(w), w ≥ 0, (3.66)
and
lim
b→min(µ,p)−
pi∗b (w) = pi
∗
0(w), w ≥ 0. (3.67)
In words, the b = r case is the limit of the borrowing case as the borrowing rate b approaches
the rate of return r on the riskless asset. Also, the no-borrowing case is the limit of the
borrowing case as the borrowing rate approaches the minimum of the proportion consumed
and the drift on the risky asset.
Finally, we indicate how the results of this section are related to those under the
same financial model for an individual who maximizes her expected discounted utility of
consumption, when the utility function exhibits CRRA. We give the parameter values
of the utility maximization problem that lead to identical consumption and investment
strategies as we found for the individual who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin.
As in Section 2.3, let β = λ + p. From Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1991), we can
show that
(i) If µ−rσ2
1
ar+1
< 1, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin
behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −ar, or equivalently, with CRRA =
1 + ar.
(ii) If µ−b
σ2
1
k+1
< 1 ≤ µ−r
σ2
1
k+1
, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime
ruin behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −k, or equivalently, with CRRA
= 1 + k.
(iii) If µ−bσ2
1
ab+1
≥ 1, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin
behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −ab, or equivalently, with CRRA =
1 + ab.
4. Numerical Example
In this section, we present a numerical example to demonstrate the results in Sec-
tions 2.2 and 3.2. Because the probabilities of ruin and optimal investment strategies are
explicitly or implicitly analytical, they are easy to implement with mathematical software.
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Assume that real consumption is given by c(w) = c; that is, consumption is a constant
(real) dollar rate. By giving the riskless rate r, the borrowing rate b, and the drift of the
risky asset µ in real terms, we thereby model constant consumption in terms of real dollars.
Assume the following parameter values:
• λ = 0.04; the hazard rate is constant such that the expected future lifetime is 25 years.
• r = 0.02; the riskless rate of return is 2% over inflation.
• b = 0.04; the borrowing rate is 4% over inflation.
• µ = 0.06; the risky asset’s drift is 6% over inflation.
• σ = 0.20; the risky asset’s volatility is 20%.
• c = 1; the individual consumes one unit of wealth per year.
In this example, the lending level wl = 14.64 and the borrowing level wb = 10.62.
Thus, in the no-borrowing case, the individual will invest pi∗0(w) = w in the risky asset
when w ≤ 14.64 and will invest less than her wealth when w > 14.64. In the case for which
the individual is allowed to borrow at the real rate of 4%, the individual will borrow money
when w < 10.62, will invest exactly her wealth in the risky asset when 10.62 ≤ w ≤ 14.64,
and will invest less than her wealth when w > 14.64. See Figure 1 for a graph of the
functions y, z, and zb. Note that y > z for 0 < w < 14.64, y > zb for 0 < w < 10.62, and
y < zb for 10.62 < w < 14.64, as expected from Lemma 3.5.
Figure 1 about here
See Figure 2 for a graph of the functions ψ, ψ0, and ψb, in which ψ is the probability
of lifetime ruin in the unconstrained model for which b = r. Note that ψ ≤ ψb ≤ ψ0 on
[0, c/r], as expected. limb→µ− wb = wµ = 7.39 in this case; therefore, ψ0 is not convex for
w < 7.39.
Figure 2 about here
See Figure 3 for a graph of the functions ζ, ζ0, and ζb, the amount invested in the
riskless asset under the model for which b = r, under the no-borrowing model, and under
the model for which b = 0.04 > r, respectively. Specifically, ζ(w) = w − pi∗(w), and
similarly for ζ0(w) and ζb(w). Recall that ζ(w) < 0 means that the individual borrows
|ζ(w)| at rate r, while ζb(w) < 0 means that the individual borrows |ζb(w)| at rate b.
For w > 14.64, the three graphs are identical. For w ≤ 14.64, ζ0 ≡ 0, so it is difficult
to see; similarly, for ζb on the interval [10.62, 14.64]. Notice that for w < 10.62, the
graph of the amount borrowed under the b = 0.04 case is steeper than under the case for
which b = r = 0.02. For wealth near zero, the individual borrows more money when the
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borrowing rate is higher because she does not derive as much benefit from the leveraging
when she pays more interest on the amount she borrows.
Figure 3 about here
In Figure 4, we plot the graphs of ζb for three values of b: 0.04, 0.055, and 0.059. Note
that pi∗b diverges for wealth near zero, as we expect from Theorem 3.12.
Figure 4 about here
5. Summary and Future Research
In this paper, we consider an investment decision problem for an individual who seeks
to minimize the probability of outliving her wealth under borrowing constraints. We con-
sider two market models with different borrowing constraints. In the first model, the
individual is prohibited from borrowing, whereas in the second model, the individual bor-
rows at a rate that is higher than the rate earned on a (positive) investment in the riskless
asset. The individual either consumes at a constant (real) dollar rate, or she consumes
a constant proportion of her wealth. In each case, we find the minimum probability of
lifetime ruin together with the optimal investment strategy.
Under the no-borrowing constraint, when the consumption function is constant, the
optimal investment strategy turns out to be a truncated version of the optimal investment
strategy in the unconstrained case. The wealth level above which the individual invests a
positive amount in the riskless asset, “the lending level,” turns out to be the same as it is
under the unconstrained case. Below that level, the optimal investment strategy prescribes
to put all the wealth in the risky asset.
In the market model with different borrowing and lending rates, when the consumption
function is constant, the individual will borrow money to invest in the risky asset when
the current wealth is lower than some “borrowing level,” will invest money in the riskless
asset when her current wealth is higher than some “lending level” (which is greater than
the borrowing level and is equal to the lending level in the case for which b = r), and will
invest all her money in the risky asset if her current wealth is between the borrowing level
and the lending level.
Somewhat surprisingly, the model with a higher borrowing rate does not always con-
verge to the model with the no-borrowing constraint as the borrowing rate goes to the drift
of the risky asset. It turns out that the convergence holds only if the hazard rate of the
individual is greater than or equal to the drift of the risky asset. On the other hand, when
the hazard rate is lower than the drift of the risky asset, the risk of running out of money
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before dying is great enough for low wealth that the individual borrows increasingly more
money as the borrowing rate increases.
In both of the market models, when the consumption rate is proportional to the wealth,
the individual who minimizes the probability of lifetime ruin behaves like an individual
who maximizes her discounted utility of consumption under the same borrowing constraint
when the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
When we include life annuities in the financial market model, the probability of ruin
decreases since the price of an annuity that guarantees the fixed consumption rate is less
than the wealth over which the lifetime ruin probability is zero (“the safe level”) (Milevsky,
Moore, and Young, 2004). Therefore, in future work, we will extend our market model
to include life annuities and determine the optimal investment allocations among risky
and riskless assets and life annuities for an individual who minimizes her probability of
lifetime ruin under borrowing constraints assumed here. We also would like to extend our
results to the more realistic case in which the hazard rate is time varying and apply the
optimal stopping formulation developed in Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2004) to solve
the problem given in this paper with borrowing constraints.
Also, comonotonicity and its applications to finance and insurance have been exten-
sively studied by Goovaerts, Dhaene, Kaas, Denuit, and their co-workers; for example, see
Dhaene et al. (2005) and Vanduffel, Dhaene, and Goovaerts (2005). Amongst other appli-
cations, they propose comonotonic approximations to tackle multi-period optimal portfo-
lio selection problems under very flexible deterministic saving and consumption patterns.
Their techniques might be useful to apply in our setting under more realistic modeling
assumptions, such as random interest rates, more general risky asset price processes, and
random consumption processes.
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Figure 1: Graph of y, z, and zb. The solid line corresponds to y; the dashed
line to z; and the dotted line to zb.
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Figure 2: Graph of ψ, ψ0, and ψb. The solid line corresponds to ψ; the
dashed line to ψ0; and the dotted line to ψb.
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Figure 3: Graph of ζ, ζ0, and ζb. The solid line corresponds to ζ; the dashed
line to ζ0; and the dotted line to ζb.
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Figure 4: Graph of ζb for various values of b. The solid line corresponds to
b = 0.04; the dashed line to b = 0.055; and the dotted line to b = 0.59.
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